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The questions addressed in this paper are whether and how reported mortality
reminders can function as an indication of sincerity when communicating ambiguously
motivated decisions. In two experiments, participants were exposed to a fictitious
CEO who announced a decision to implement new organizational measures that were
both environmentally and financially beneficial. In the experimental condition, the CEO
attributed her new ideas to a recent mortality reminder. In the active control condition,
the CEO attributed her decision to a non-lethal dentistry health scare, and in the passive
control condition the CEO did not give any account of events preceding her decision.
When a CEO implemented new corporate initiatives after a mortality reminder, her
motivation for doing so was perceived as somewhat more motivated by intrinsic values,
and significantly less motivated by financial gains. This change in attribution patterns
was demonstrated to be indirectly related to a positive evaluation of the CEO, as well as
an increased willingness to pay for the organization’s services. The second experiment
further demonstrated that the reduced attribution to financial motivation associated
with mortality awareness persisted even when the CEO in question was known for
placing a high personal priority on financial goal attainment. The findings underscore
the importance of perceived value-oriented motivation when communicating climate
change mitigating policies, and the role of mortality awareness as one of many ways
to induce such attributions.
Keywords: mortality salience, terror management, CSR communication, attribution, value-orientation
INTRODUCTION
There is a growing consensus that corporations have a social responsibility to serve communities,
society, and the environment in ways that go above and beyond what is legally required (Wood,
1991; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Lockett et al., 2006). This form of social responsibility is
typically referred to as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The goal of most CSR initiatives is to
achieve sustained competitive advantage by attracting and retaining support from consumers and
other stakeholders (Waddock, 2008; Devinney, 2009; Porter and Kramer, 2011). CSR measures
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frequently involve activities and goals that appear to go against
the corporate logic of profit, such as philanthropy, community
development, environmental conservation, or social justice (Van
Marrewijk, 2003). In many cases, however, the CSR goals neatly
overlap with the ordinary corporate goals, such as reducing costly
waste and conserving energy.
Organizations and individuals face a dilemma regarding how
to communicate their CSR policies to the public. In general,
most consumers want corporations to act as good corporate
citizens. However, consumers are often also quite skeptical of
corporations that promote their good citizenship (Brønn and
Vrioni, 2001; Morsing et al., 2008; Lii and Lee, 2012). Yoon
et al. (2006) found that in cases where a company was perceived
as insincere, CSR communications actually hurt the company
image. Similarly, psychological research has demonstrated that
perceived intentions and motivations are crucial when labeling
actions morally good or bad. For a behavior to be considered
morally praiseworthy, the agent must not only have intended
and brought about the action and its consequences, she must
also have performed the act for reasons that are themselves
praiseworthy (Fedotova et al., 2011; Gray et al., 2012; Critcher
et al., in preparation). Organizations thus face a perilous and
delicate situation. By under-communicating CSR activities, one
faces the risk of people never learning about the activities, and
possibly assuming that no CSR initiatives have been made. By
failing to communicate CSR messages in a sincere and believable
fashion, one faces the risk of skepticism and cynicism among
of weary consumers, who disbelieve the accuracy and sincerity
of the claims, and the efficacy of the policies (Morsing et al.,
2008). This danger of perceived insincerity is also relevant when
corporations engage in environmentally friendly activities. Even
though communicating environmentally oriented CSR policies
and activities could elicit positive reactions, it may also lead
to adverse motivational attributions (see Groza et al., 2011). In
cases where the sustainability initiatives are seen as primarily
motivated by financial gain, people often respond negatively
(Morsing and Schultz, 2006). Previous research has demonstrated
that people easily suspect ulterior motives when they hear of
corporate activities that are both environmentally and financially
beneficial (de Vries et al., 2013; Windsor, 2013). As perceived
sincerity of motivation has been identified as a key success factor
for CSR communication, and as CSR is becoming an increasingly
important part of brand strategy, it is important to understand
how consumers perceive the motivation behind different CSR
strategies, and identify the antecedents to favorable motivational
attribution (Du et al., 2010; Debeljak et al., 2011; Olsen et al.,
2014).
In this paper, we explored how justifying ambiguously
motivated CSR initiatives with a recent mortality reminder
can mitigate suspicion of extrinsic motivation. The overarching
research question was whether people recently exposed to a
mortality reminder are perceived as more value-oriented. By
perceived value-orientation, we mean a combination of more
attribution to intrinsic moral or ideological convictions, and
less attribution to extrinsic factors, such as financial gains, and
external expectations on behalf of consumers and stakeholders.
The research question is particularly interesting in order to
understand how people perceive individuals and organizations
who attempt to portray themselves as morally motivated, while
obviously also being motivated by financial gain. It is also of
immediate concern for research on how to increase favorable
evaluation of climate change mitigating CSR initiatives in the
population at large, as cynical motivational attribution may be
a barrier against positive evaluations of such initiatives. While
previous research has speculated that mortality awareness can
aid people into more environmentally friendly attitudes and
behaviors (Vail et al., 2012), we extend the investigation into how
a motivational attribution can be altered when we know that the
observed person is in a state of elevated mortality awareness.
Mortality Salience
The psychological and behavioral consequences of thinking about
death, and the mortality of the self and others, have been studied
extensively (Burke et al., 2010). Most of this research has been
conducted within the framework of terror management theory
(Greenberg et al., 1997; Pyszczynski et al., 1999). Typical terror
management has been studied in experiments where one group is
exposed to a mortality prime, e.g., an instruction to describe what
happens to the physical body after death, while a control group
is exposed to a control prime, e.g., an instruction to describe
a painful dentistry treatment (Burke et al., 2010). After an
initial priming manipulation, participants then go on to indicate
their attitudes, or perform behaviors that are hypothesized to
be affected by the presence of mortality awareness. According
to TMT, people have an innate existential motivation to turn
to meaning-providing structures to cope with the knowledge
of inevitable mortality (Greenberg et al., 1990; Routledge et al.,
2008). The most commonly observed coping mechanisms are
increased investments in-, and defense of, own cultural world
views, and self-esteem (Baumeister, 1991). Subsequent increase
in self-esteem and an increased defense of one’s own cultural
world views have been observed as a reaction to mortality primes
in a vast number of studies (Burke et al., 2010), while a slight
shift toward political conservatism has been observed in others
(Jost et al., 2003). These reactions are typically referred to as
‘distal defenses’, meaning that the process by which they arise
as a response to the mortality prime is typically not consciously
accessible (Greenberg et al., 2000). Terror management studies
using attributions as outcome measure have yielded findings in
line with the theoretical framework, demonstrating that mortality
primes increase the tendency for self serving attributions and
imbuing everyday actions with meaning (Mikulincer and Florian,
2002; Landau et al., 2010).
Mortality Salience and Different
Motivations
The idea that awareness of one’s own mortality may be related
to changes in the priority of extrinsic pursuits is not new. All
five major religions present recurrent reminders of how material
riches are rendered empty in the face of mortality. Works
of literature and philosophy further echo the notion that the
thought of one’s inevitable death can make efforts to obtain
superfluous material value seem inauthentic and meaningless.
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The existential psychologists Yalom (1980, 2008), as well as
classic literary characters like Dickens’s Ebenezer Scrooge, have
illustrated how intimations of mortality make strivings for wealth
and social status seem vacuous and void of meaning. Councilors
working with terminal patients, or people who have had near-
death experiences, report that a typical reaction is to devaluate
the meaning of material possessions and ego-enhancement
(Kinnier et al., 2001; Ware, 2011). The effects of mortality
primes on materialism and extrinsic vs. value-driven motivation
have been researched quite extensively. While philosophy and
literature point solely toward a decrease in extrinsic motivation
as consequence of mortality reminders, TMT experiments offer
more complex results. Kosloff and Greenberg (2009) found that
participants who were asked how much importance they placed
on extrinsic pursuits tended to trivialize their importance if
asked directly after the mortality prime. However, when given
a distractor task between the presentation of the mortality
prime and the subsequent questionnaire, participants gave higher
importance ratings for a high priority extrinsic goal. The authors
argued that such effects may arise because the affirmation of
personally important extrinsic goals can lead to higher self-
esteem and defense of the sources of meaning in life. Across
most TMT experiments, the delay and distraction between the
mortality prime and outcome measure is used to allow for
mortality cognitions to fade from consciousness, as the distal
defenses are theorized to only manifest after the thought has
faded from consciousness (Burke et al., 2010). Increase in self-
esteem and embracement of one’s cultural world views are the
two well-known distal defenses, and as such, it is in line with
TMT that the increased investment in extrinsic goals after a
mortality prime is only present when a distractor task is used,
and the extrinsic goal considered culturally and/or personally
important (Arndt et al., 2004). Support for pro-environmental
attitudes can be increased as a reaction to a mortality prime,
but only in cases where people are already imbued with pro-
environmental attitudes (Vess and Arndt, 2008; Fritsche and
Häfner, 2012), or when pro-environmental norms are a salient
part of the environment (Fritsche et al., 2010). Taken together,
these findings suggest that the predictable reaction toward a
mortality prime is increased defense of one’s cultural worldview
and self-esteem. Provided that extrinsic pursuits are the central
theme in one’s cultural worldview, and/or the prominent source
of positive self-esteem, mortality primes should induce an
increased investment in those extrinsic pursuits. If morally
motivated pro-environmentalism is an important part of one’s
cultural world view, and/or important source of self-esteem,
mortality primes should reliably induce increased engagement in
those pursuits.
While some research has focused on the link between
mortality salience, extrinsic motivation, and environmental
attitudes and behavior, less is known about how mortality salience
can affect the motivational attribution of other people’s behavior.
Even though the presented paper draws upon TMT research,
it departs from the terror management tradition in one crucial
aspect. Whereas most TMT research focuses on how people
respond when primed with reminders of their own mortality,
this study explores how an observed decision maker is perceived,
when that decision maker claims to have been made more
acutely aware of her own mortality. To the very best of our
knowledge, people’s lay-theories about the nature of motivation
under mortality awareness have not previously been described
in the literature. However, past research has demonstrated that
people often infer that the motivational processes they experience
are present in the minds of others as well (Reeder and Trafimow,
2005). This is why we chose to base the direction of our
hypotheses on TMT research. The experiments presented here
were designed to test if and how a decision makers’ claimed
mortality awareness can eschew motivational attribution from
financial and extrinsic to value-oriented. The experiments tested
perceptions of behaviors and decisions made by an executive in a
corporate setting.
Research Outline: Mortality Awareness
and Perceived Value-Orientation
The independent variable (IV) in TMT research is the presence
or absence of a psychological prime that makes the issue of
mortality more or less salient in the experiment situation. As
the present research in more concerned with social perception
(i.e., the perception of others), the IV in this study was
termed morality awareness, referring to the extent to which
the decision maker claimed to have been acutely aware of her
own mortality. According to Critcher et al. (in preparation),
people engage in social-cognitive mind reading when assessing
how morally praiseworthy an observed behavior is. This mind
reading entails picking up cues that indicate the extent to
which the observed person seems to appreciate the underlying
moral principle behind their behavior. We hypothesized that
mortality awareness may serve as such a cue, highlighting that the
demonstrated behavior is more motivated by moral values such
as a sincere appreciation for the importance of sustainability and
environmental protection, and less by financial gains and external
expectations. The setting of the experiment was a description of
a fictitious company that had recently decided to implement CSR
measures that were not only environmentally beneficial, but also
cost saving for the company, as the customers would bear the cost
of the initiatives. In this particular case, the setting is a hotel chain
manager who decided to reduce the size of plates and glasses
at the buffet, install water saving showers, and adopt a more
restrictive policy regarding changing of towels and linens. These
initiatives are all clearly environmentally friendly, as they will lead
to reduced waste of food and drink, reduced energy consumption,
and reduced use of detergents and emission of wastewater. They
are also certainly financially beneficial, as they will reduce costs
on behalf of the hotel. The CEO in question claimed that the
new initiatives were motivated by her sincere appreciation for the
importance of environmental care and climate change mitigation.
However, as all these cost-saving measures are ultimately carried
by the consumer, and directly and positively influencing the
company cash flow, the sincerity of the CEO’s motivation was
clearly questionable. Our first prediction, derived from TMT,
was that the CEO who decided to implement these measures
would be presumed to be more motivated by her intrinsic values,
and less motivated by extrinsic factors, if she was perceived as
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having been acutely aware of her own mortality when she made
the decision. Our second prediction was that this relationship
would be reversed, if the observed decision maker was known
to put a strong personal priority on financial goal attainment.
Two experiments were designed to test each of the predictions,
respectively.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 was designed to explore if a person’s ambiguously
motivated decision is attributed to different motivations,
depending on whether, or not the decision maker has recently
been reminded of her own mortality. The IV was the
circumstances that led the CEO to come up with the new
initiatives. The three experimental conditions only differed in
how the CEO answered to a question of how these ideas
came about, one of which involves mortality awareness. In the
mortality awareness condition, the CEO claimed to have had
a mortality reminder, and subsequently decided to implement
the aforementioned CSR initiatives. We predicted that this set
of events would lead to more value-based attributions, and
less attributions to extrinsic factors, compared to the control
conditions, which do not involve mortality awareness. As value-
based attributions were expected to be associated with support
for CSR initiatives, the first hypothesis predicted a direct effect
between mortality awareness as justification, and favorable
evaluation of the CSR initiatives.
H1: Reporting that a mortality reminder preceded the decision
to implement environmentally friendly policies will lead to (a)
more positive evaluation of decision maker and (b) higher
willingness to pay, compared to active, and passive control.
We further predicted that the participants would expect a
decision maker who was highly aware of her own mortality to
be more inclined to make decisions that were motivated by her
ideology, morality and values, compared to a decision maker who
did not come across as acutely aware of her own mortality. More
specifically, we predicted that the mortality awareness would
lead to an increase in value-based motivational attribution, and
reduction in attribution to extrinsic motivations. The second
hypothesis was thus:
H2: Reporting that a mortality reminder preceded the decision to
implement ambiguously motivated policies will lead to (a) more
attribution to value-based motivation, and (b) less attribution to
extrinsic factors, compared to both control conditions.
Past research in moral psychology has demonstrated that
perceptions of underlying intentions are crucial in determining
whether or not a behavior is morally praiseworthy (Fedotova
et al., 2011; Gray et al., 2012), and CSR research has demonstrated
that perceived sincerity of motivation is a crucial success factor
for CSR communication (Du et al., 2010; de Vries et al., 2013).
Our final prediction was therefore that the positive perceptual
outcomes generated by using mortality reminder as justification
would be mediated by a higher tendency to attribute the measures
to value-based motivation. The third and final hypothesis was
therefore:
H3: The relationship between presence of mortality awareness in
justification and (a) more positive evaluation of decision maker
and (b) higher willingness to pay, will be mediated by degree of
value-based attributions.
Figure 1 displays the conceptual model for Experiment 1, with
predicted paths in accordance with the hypotheses.
Materials and Pre-Test
Both experiments used video footage of an actress portraying a
CEO in an interview setting. The actress was instructed to portray
her character in a realistic manner, while maintain identical
postures, facial expressions, and tone of voice in all recordings.
The video started with a rolling text stating: “Ellen Hansen is the
CEO of a large Nordic hotel chain. She has just approved a new
plan to make the hotels more environmentally friendly. Among
the measures are reducing the size of plates and glasses at the
breakfast buffet with 20 percent, in order to reduce waste of food.
Furthermore, the hotels have been equipped with water-saving
showers. Additionally, the hotels have adopted a more restrictive
policy on changing of towels and linens on shorter stays. [New
paragraph] In an interview, Ellen explained the background for
the decision:” Here, the video continued to a fictitious interview,
wherein the actress portraying the CEO, stated: “We are now
taking measures in order to become more socially responsible. The
climate threat is one of the biggest challenges that humanity has
ever faced, and our chain has to be a part of the solution”. This
part of the video constituted the passive control condition, and
was identical for all conditions. The independent variable, i.e.,
the justification for the decision, was introduced at the end of
this video. The screen showed the text: “When asked how she got
the idea for these measures, she replied:”. The mortality awareness
video showed that the CEO attributed her decision to a recent
mortality reminder: “A while ago I discovered a lump in my
armpit. I contacted the doctor, who informed me that he couldn’t
say for certain what this was, but that it could be the early form of
a lethal and incurable form of cancer. They took a sample of the
cells, and sent it to a lab for analysis. I had to wait 2 weeks for the
results to arrive. The waiting was very demanding, and it got me
thinking about what really matters in life. That’s when I decided to
run the company in a more sustainable direction. The results came
back negative, and the lump disappeared, but the motivation stayed
with me”. In accordance with past TMT research (see Burke et al.,
2010), the active control video displayed the same CEO, who
attributed her decision to a recent non-lethal dental health scare:
“A while ago I got a terrible oral infection. I contacted the dentist,
who told me that it was either something that would pass away by
itself, or an infection of the gums, in which case I would have to
undergo a harmless but painful operation. He took some samples,
and told me to wait a couple of weeks for the results. The waiting
period was very demanding, and it got me thinking about what
really matters in life. That’s when I decided to run the company
in a more sustainable direction. The results came back negative,
and the pain went away, but the motivation stayed with me”. This
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FIGURE 1 | Conceptual model.
active control condition contained many of the same elements
as the mortality awareness condition, in that they both entailed
insecurity, loss of control, physical pain, and personal health
problems. Both conditions were liable to induce pity on behalf
of the observer, and both could be seen as candid and forthright
accounts of a private matter. The significant difference between
the experiment condition and the active control condition was
the mortality reminder referenced in the experiment condition,
pitted against the explicit non-lethality of the dentistry condition.
Before the experiments, all video stimuli was pre-tested on a
student sample. A total of 11 participants saw both versions of the
video, in random order, producing a total of 22 observations. The
pre-test examined how the actress was perceived in each video in
terms of how enthusiastic and interpersonally warm the CEO was
rated. Across the observations, no significant differences between
the groups were found. After the test, the participants were told
how the stimuli were to be used, and asked if any of the videos
stood out as different from the other, aside from the different
words the actress conveyed. None of the participants indicated
that any of the videos differed from the others in such a way.
Sample and Procedure
Participants (N = 87) were recruited from a Norwegian
university law school (40 female, mean age 22). Participation
was compensated with a 60 NOK (∼11 $) gift card to the
student cafeteria. Before the experiment, participants were told
that the experiment would be about communication, business,
and environmental care. The participants were guaranteed
anonymity, and allowed to discontinue the study at any time.
All participants indicated informed consent electronically, in
accordance with the declaration of Helsinki. The study was
approved by the Vice-Rector of Research at The Norwegian
School of Economics.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two
experimental groups and one passive control group. The
participants assembled in different classrooms. Before the
experiment started, they were given instructions on how to
respond during the experiment via their smartphones, tablets,
or computers. The participants were furthermore instructed to
give responses individually, and maintain silence throughout
the experiment. The participants first responded to Kanter and
Mirvis’ (1989) dispositional cynicism scale, and Milfont and
Duckitt’s (2010) environmental attitude scale. They were then
exposed to one of three different videos, as described in the
section above. The video was displayed on a big screen in the
classroom. Participants in the passive control condition (N = 27)
saw the video wherein no justification was asked for, and went on
to complete the survey. The second group saw the active control
dentistry video (N = 29), and continued to give their responses
on the outcome measures. The third group saw the mortality
awareness video (N = 31), and continued to give their responses
on the outcome measures. All participants had to view the entire
designated video before they could move on in the experiment.
Figure 2 illustrates the experimental procedure.
Dependent Measures
Having seen their respective video, all participants were
instructed to complete a survey, detailing their attitudes toward
the decision and the decision maker, as well as perceived
communicative intention, and motivational attributions
pertaining to the decision (see Appendix for a complete overview
of all). All outcome measures were entered into a principle
components factor analysis, with direct oblim rotation. The
analyses extracted four factors with an eigenvalue above 1.00.
According to Singh (1991), deviations from the normative use
of one as eigenvalue cut-off score is permissible in cases where
adherence to the norm would produce redundancy in constructs.
Using scree plot analyses of the eigenvalues (see Hair et al.,
1998) a drop in eigenvalue between the fifth and sixth factors
was identified. This was consistent with the expected factor
structure. As the factor analysis was used mainly to investigate
the internal consistency of my measures, we applied similar
criteria to Rust et al. (2004) (parsimony, managerial usefulness,
and psychological meaningfulness) and applied a five factor
structure in these analyses. Table 1 displays the measurement
model.
Liking decision maker, perceiving decision maker as
professional, perceiving decision maker as competent, and
willingness to endorse decision maker as a member on an
advisory board on ethical investment were all measured on
seven-point Likert scales. These items formed the factor
evaluation of decision maker (factor 4 in Table 1) (Cronbachs
α = 0.84). A single item measuring liking decision had to be
removed due to multicollinearity. The CSR attribution scale from
Groza et al. (2011) was also deployed, but due to cross-loading,
only six of the nine items were included in the analysis. The
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FIGURE 2 | Experimental procedure: Experiment 1.
TABLE 1 | Measurement model in Experiment 1.
Item: Mean SD Factor loadings
1 2 3 4 5
Like decision maker 4,81 1,18 −0.595
Endorse decision maker 4,31 1,55 −0.671
Decision maker is professional 4,95 1,36 −0.918
Decision maker is competent 4,77 1,24 −0.935
Moral motivation 4,92 1,42 0.719
. . . they have a long-term interest in society 3,39 0.94 0.889
. . . they believe in environmental care 3,76 0.96 0.861
... they are trying to give back to society 3,07 1,02 0.817
. . . their customers expect them to do this 3,43 1,14 0.922
. . . society in general expects them to do this 3,56 0.973 0.833
. . . they will retain more customers by doing this 3,38 0.94 0.721
Attitudinal persuasion knowledge 4,06 0.89 0.844
Behavioral persuasion knowledge 3,93 0.89 0.890
Willingness to pay 4,38 0.78 0.944
three items measuring value-driven attribution were combined
with the single item measuring perceived moral motivation to
form the factor value-based attributions (factor 1 in Table 1)
(Cronbachs α = 0.84). The mean score on the three remaining
attribution items was labeled extrinsic attribution (factor 2
in Table 1) (Cronbachs α = 0.72). The concept persuasion
knowledge refers to the extent to which a person feels that the
communicative intention of another person is to manipulate or
persuade them. In this experiment, persuasion knowledge refers
to the extent to which participants felt that the CEO had such
a communicative intention, and was measured with two items
(factor 3 in Table 1). One item assessed attitudinal persuasion
knowledge (i.e., “the CEO is attempting to change my attitudes”)
and another item assessed behavioral persuasion knowledge
(i.e., “the CEO is attempting to influence my future choices”)
(Cronbachs = 0.70). However, the measure was not used in the
further analysis. Finally, participants were asked to indicate their
willingness to pay in reference to a normal price for an equivalent
room at an equivalent hotel, given their new information (factor
5 in Table 1). The participants indicated their willingness to pay
on a seven-point scale, with zero percent as center value, and
10% increases or decreases in price in each direction, with 30%
more and 30% less as extreme values. All standardized scales
used in this study were translated to Norwegian. The following
process assured the quality of the translation: first, three Ph.D.
students working separately produced a translation of each
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item. Secondly, three bilingual professors at the department of
language choose which translation was correct. The professors
provided their votes separately. Across all items, the professors
were unanimous in all but two cases, in which the version with
two out of three votes was selected. This translation procedure
is very similar to the one recommended by Douglas and Craig
(2007).
Results
Correlational findings from this experiment were in line with
past research that has shown that motivational attribution is a
crucial factor for positive evaluation in CSR communication (Du
et al., 2010; Groza et al., 2011; de Vries et al., 2013). A high
score on the value-based attribution measure was positively
associated with liking the decision (r = 0.51, p < 0.01), and
a positive overall evaluation of the decision maker (r = 0.58,
p < 0.01). The two first hypotheses predicted between-groups
differences in how the CEO would be perceived and how her
decision would be attributed. In order to test the hypotheses,
we conducted a series of ANOVAs where condition (mortality
awareness vs. active control vs. passive control) was always the
between-subject variable, and where the dependent variables
were evaluation of decision maker, willingness to pay, extrinsic
attribution, and value-based attribution, respectively. As we
were only seeking to address the question of how mortality
awareness can produce differences in evaluation and attribution,
we performed planned contrasts of [mortality awareness] vs.
[active control + passive control]. We also performed planned
contrasts between the two active conditions, i.e., [active control]
vs. [mortality awareness]. According to Hypothesis 1, the
CEO would be perceived more favorably by participants in
the mortality awareness condition than by participants in the
two control groups. The results revealed statistically significant
differences between group means [F(2,84) = 4.13, p = 0.02].
The planned contrast tests indicated that the CEO was given
a more positive evaluation by participants in the mortality
awareness condition compared to the active control condition
CEO [t(83) = −2.16, p = 0.02, d = 0.57, 95% CI from 0.30 to
0.86], but not compared to both control conditions combined
[t(83) = 1.11, p = 0.69, d = 0.25, 95% CI from −0.48 to −0.02].
Hypothesis 1a was thus only partially supported. We further
predicted that the mortality salient CEO would produce a higher
willingness to pay than the control conditions. The ANOVA did
not provide support for this prediction [F(2,84)= 0.88, p= 0.42],
and the planned contrast tests demonstrated no significant
differences in willingness to pay. Hypothesis 2 stated that the
CEO whose justification involved mortality awareness would
produce more value-based attributions, and less attribution
to extrinsic motivations. The ANOVA failed to demonstrate
significant between groups differences [F(2,84)= 2.13, p= 0.09].
However, the planned contrast tests indicated that the mortality
salient CEO came across as significantly more motivated by
intrinsic values, compared with the two control groups combined
[t(84) = 2.18, p = 0.03, d = 0.49, 95% CI from 0.31 to
0.68], but not when compared solely with the active control
group [t(84) = −1.66, p = 0.10, d = 0.43, 95% CI from 0.23
to.61]. Hypothesis 2a thus only received partial support. Finally,
the groups were found to differ significantly, in line with the
hypothesis, with regards to attributing the decision to extrinsic
motivation [F(2,84) = 4.20, p = 0.02]. The planned contrast test
showed that the mortality aware CEO came across as significantly
less motivated by extrinsic factors, compared to the two control
conditions combined [t(84) = −2.89, p < 0.01, d = −0.63, 95%
CI from −0.82 to −0.50], and compared to only active control
[t(84) = 2.42, p = 0.01, d = −0.53, 95% CI from −0.82 to
−0.43]. This finding supported Hypothesis 2b. Figure 3 displays
the mean evaluations between the groups in perceptual outcomes
and motivational attribution.
In order to test Hypothesis 3, two simple mediation analyses
were conducted. Across the analysis of differences between the
groups, the active control group and passive control group did
not differ significantly on any dispositional measures or outcome
measure except evaluation of decision maker. While hypotheses
1 and 2 predict direct effects of mortality awareness compared
to both passive and active control stimuli, hypotheses 3a and
3b represent attempts at exploring the mediating factors that
are affected by the presence or absence of mortality awareness.
As such, and in order to increase the validity and power of the
mediation analysis necessitated by Hypothesis 3, the results from
the active and passive control groups were combined into a single
group. The tested models are illustrated in Figure 4.
We employed Preacher and Hayes’s (2004, 2008) PROCESS
macro for SPSS. The proposed mediation models revealed
no significant direct effect on any of the perceptual outcome
measures. Although the direct effects are absent, it is still
possible and useful to test and report the indirect relationships
in the proposed model (see Hayes, 2009). In such analyses,
where a direct effect between X and Y is absent, the proposed
mediators are better referred to as indirect relationships, rather
than mediated relationships (Mathieu and Taylor, 2006). The
first predicted relationship was between presence or absence
of mortality awareness, value-based attribution, and evaluation
of decision maker. The analysis revealed a significant indirect
effect. A bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the
indirect effect based on 10,000 bootstrap samples was entirely
above zero (from 0.0524 to 0.6469). The coefficients revealed
that presence of mortality awareness led to significantly higher
levels of value-based attribution, which in turn was significantly
positively associated with positive evaluation of decision maker.
Hypothesis 3a was thus supported. Figure 5 displays the model,
with coefficients.
In order to test Hypothesis 3b, the same analysis was repeated,
but with willingness to pay as outcome measure. Once again,
the indirect effect proved significant, with confidence intervals
entirely above zero (from 0.0249 to 0.2887). As predicted, the
coefficients revealed that the presence of mortality awareness
led to higher levels of value-based attribution, which in turn
was found to be significantly positively related to higher
willingness to pay. These findings underscore the importance
of value-based attribution as antecedent to favorable outcomes
in strategic CSR communication. In as much as the predicted
mechanisms were proven significant, Hypothesis 3 is supported.
Figure 6 displays the mediation model with corresponding
coefficients.
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FIGURE 3 | Mean evaluation between groups. ∗ Difference between mortality awareness and passive control is significant at p < 0.05. ∗∗ Difference between
mortality awareness and active control is significant at p < 0.05. ∗∗∗ Differences between mortality awareness and both control groups are significant at p < 0.05.
FIGURE 4 | Predicted mediated relationship.
Discussion
The results from Experiment 1 demonstrated that the decision
maker who had recently suffered a mortality reminder was seen
as more motivated by moral values, and significantly less by
extrinsic or instrumental factors. Furthermore, the support of
Hypothesis 3 demonstrates that this difference in attribution is
a relevant factor when participants evaluate the decision maker,
and when they determine their willingness to pay. However,
having recently been reminded of her own mortality did not
change evaluation of the decision maker or willingness to pay
directly. Nevertheless, the results offer support for the notion
that ambiguously motivated decisions made by a decision maker
who appears aware of her own mortality is seen as less driven
by extrinsic motivation. The first experiment thus demonstrates
that the identified main effect of mortality primes is also
relevant in social perception: people expect a decision maker
to be less motivated by extrinsic factors when she has recently
been exposed to a mortality reminder. This result is allegorical
to the general finding from TMT, which states that people
tend to trivialize the importance of extrinsic pursuits after a
mortality prime (Burke et al., 2010). However, the TMT literature
suggests that the relationship between mortality salience and
motivation for extrinsic pursuits is moderated by the personal
priority placed on the extrinsic pursuit in question (Kosloff
and Greenberg, 2009). The moderated relationship states that
mortality primes remove motivation for low-priority extrinsic
pursuits, but increases the motivation for high-priority extrinsic
pursuits (Arndt et al., 2004). As the importance of this moderator
has been readily demonstrated within the TMT tradition, the aim
of the second experiment in this paper was to explore whether
the same moderated relationship is relevant in perception of
others.
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FIGURE 5 | Indirect effect of mortality awareness on positive evaluation of decision maker, via increased value-based attributions.
FIGURE 6 | Indirect effect of mortality awareness on willingness to pay, via increased value-based attributions.
EXPERIMENT 2
The aim of Experiment 2 was to explore the extent to
which mortality awareness may serve as an indicator of value-
driven motivation in cases where the observed decision maker
places a high importance on the attainment of financial goals.
As mentioned, TMT research indicates that mortality primes
mainly tend to amplify investments in whatever themes are
personally and/or culturally important to the decision maker
(Burke et al., 2010). Building on the assumption that people’s
perceptions of the motivation of other people largely parallels
their own motivational processes (Reeder and Trafimow, 2005),
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it is reasonable to hypothesize that their lay-theories about
other people’s motivation under mortality awareness would also
encompass this general amplification tendency. If people perceive
others in line with relevant results from TMT research, an
ambiguously motivated decision made by a recently mortality
reminded decision maker who is known to place a high priority
on financial goal attainment should generate the opposite
attributional pattern from the one demonstrated in the first
experiment. More specifically, if the findings from Kosloff and
Greenberg (2009) translate into perception of others, the decision
maker who is both acutely aware of her mortality, and known
for placing a high priority on financial goal attainment, should
be interpreted as being more motivated by the extrinsic gains
associated with the decision, and less by the claimed moral or
value-based motivation for the decision. The first hypothesis was
thus:
H1. In cases where the observed decision maker is known for
placing a high personal priority on financial goal attainment,
reporting that a mortality reminder preceded the decision to
implement environmentally and financially beneficial policies
will lead to more attribution to financial motivation.
Past research on CSR perception and motivational attribution
has demonstrated that endeavors that are perceived as self-
serving in a financial sense are often perceived as less motivated
by morality or intrinsic values (Groza et al., 2011; de Vries et al.,
2013). We therefore further predicted that the recently mortality
reminded decision maker would be perceived as less motivated
by intrinsic values and morality. The second hypothesis was
therefore:
H2. In cases where the observed decision maker is known for
placing a high personal priority on financial goal attainment,
reporting that a mortality reminder preceded the decision to
implement environmentally and financially beneficial policies
will lead to less attribution to moral motivation.
Moral psychology has demonstrated that inferences of
motivation are crucial when people make judgments about how
morally praiseworthy a behavior is (Fedotova et al., 2011; Gray
et al., 2012). Similarly, CSR research has demonstrated that the
perceived motivation behind environmental policies influence
peoples’ general perception of those policies, and the companies
that employ them (Windsor, 2013; de Vries et al., 2013; Olsen
et al., 2014). Our last prediction was therefore that the changes
in motivational attribution produced by the stated mortality
reminder would produce overall worse evaluation of the decision
and decision maker. The third and final hypothesis was thus:
H3. In cases where the observed decision maker is known for
placing a high personal priority on financial goal attainment,
reporting that a mortality reminder preceded the decision to
implement environmentally and financially beneficial policies
will lead more negative evaluation of (a) the decision and (b)
the decision maker.
Procedure, Materials, and Sample
One hundred and eighty undergraduate psychology students
(140 female, mean age 20) were recruited to participate
in the experiment. Participation was voluntary and not
compensated. Before the experiment, participants were told
that the experiment would be about communication, business,
and environmental care. The participants were guaranteed
anonymity, and allowed to discontinue the study at any time.
All participants indicated informed consent electronically, in
accordance with the declaration of Helsinki. The study was
approved by the Vice-Rector of Research at The Norwegian
School of Economics.
Again, a between-groups design was applied. Groups to
witch students had been randomly assigned were randomly
assigned to the different conditions, i.e., the passive control
group, the dentistry control group, or the mortality awareness
group. The experiment was conducted on three consecutive days.
The experimental procedure was identical to that of the first
experiment. The participants first indicated their responses to the
dispositional and attitudinal measures. After all participants had
completed these surveys, they were exposed to one of the three
different video stimuli. The only difference between the stimuli
used in this experiment, relative to the stimuli used in the first
experiment, was that the text part of the video contained one
additional piece of information, regarding the emphasis placed
on financial pursuits by the observed decision maker. The text in
the videos in the second experiment read: “Ellen Hansen is the
CEO of a large Nordic hotel chain. She has always had an intense
desire to make her hotel chain the most profitable in Europe. One
of her biggest life-time goals has been to ensure that the company
generates over 100 million NOK in profits in one fiscal year. [new
paragraph] Ellen has just approved a new plan to make the hotels
more environmentally friendly. Among the measures are reducing
the size of plates and glasses at the breakfast buffet with 20%, in
order to reduce waste of food. Furthermore, the hotels have been
equipped with water-saving showers. Additionally, the hotels have
adopted a more restrictive policy on changing of towels and linens
on shorter stays. [new paragraph] In an interview, Ellen explained
the background for the decision:” The passive control condition
participants (N = 57) saw the video wherein no justification is
asked for, and went on to complete the survey. The second group
saw the active control dentistry video (N = 55), and continued to
give their responses on the outcome measures. The third group
saw the mortality salient video (N = 68), and continued to give
their responses on the outcome measures. All participants had to
view the entire designated video before they could move on in the
experiment.
Dependent Measures
Dependent measures were identical to those used in Experiment
1. Additionally, in order to better capture the motivational
attributions of interest in this study, the measurement model in
the second experiment was supplemented with more attribution
measures. The additional attribution measures were all in the
form of statements, with which the participants indicated their
agreement on seven-point Lickert scales. The statements all
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started with “It seems like an important goal with these measures
is”. The proposed perceived goals were; please customers, save
money, ensure financial solidity, and reduced climate change. We
also added new items assessing support for the decision itself, as
the single item used in Experiment 1 had to be removed from
analysis due to cross-loading. The new items measures support
for decision from both a consumer and employee perspective,
principled support, an overall support item, and a reversed
support item. All outcome measures were initially entered into a
Principle Components factor analysis, with direct oblim rotation.
The items measuring level of endorsement for the CEO to serve at
ethics committee, as well as the item measuring willingness to pay
had to be removed due to issues with multicollinearity and cross-
loading. Table 2 displays the final measurement model used in
the experiment.
The results from the factor analysis revealed seven distinct
factors, consistent with the expected factor structure. The factors
are numbered in accordance with their position in Table 2.
The first factor was labeled support for decision (1) (Cronbachs
α = 0.86). The second factor was labeled evaluation of decision
maker (2) (Cronbachs α = 0.83). The third factor was labeled
value-based attribution (3) (Cronbachs α= 0.88). This factor
consisted of the same four items that made up the same factor
in Experiment 1, plus the addition of one item; the purpose
appears to be reduced climate change. The fourth factor was
labeled reactive attribution (4), meaning that the measures are
seen more as motivated by external expectations (see Groza et al.,
2011) (Cronbachs α= 0.86). The sixth factor was labeled financial
attribution (6) (Cronbachs α= 0.85). The fifth and seventh factor
were not utilized in further analysis.
Results
The three hypotheses predicted between-groups differences in
how the CEO would be perceived and how her decision would
be attributed. In order to test the hypotheses, we conducted
a series of ANOVAs where condition (mortality awareness vs.
active control vs. passive control) was always the between-subject
variable, and where the dependent variables were evaluation of
decision maker, support for decision, financial attribution, value-
based attribution, and reactive attribution, respectively. As we
were only seeking to address the question of how mortality
awareness can produce differences in evaluation and attribution,
we performed planned contrasts of [mortality awareness] vs.
[active control + passive control]. We also performed planned
contrasts between the two active conditions, i.e., [active control]
vs. [mortality awareness]. The degree of financial attribution
evoked differed significantly between the groups, but not in line
with Hypothesis 1 [F(2,177) = 4.81, p < 0.01]. The planned
contrast test showed that the mortality aware CEO induced lower
levels of financial attribution than the CEO presented in the
two control conditions combined [t(177) = −2.96, p < 0.01,
d = −0.45, 95% CI from −0.61 to −0.31], and active control
in isolation [t(177) = 2.05, p = 0.042, d = −0.36, 95% CI
from −0.55 to −0.17]. These findings failed to provide support
for the first hypothesis, which stated that the decision made
under mortality awareness would be more attributed to financial
motivation. Furthermore, the analyses showed no significant
group differences in value-based attribution [F(2,172) = 1.00,
p = 0.37]. The planned contrast test revealed no significant
difference between the mortality awareness condition and the two
controls combined [t(172) = 1.41, p = 0.16, d = 0.22, 95% CI
from 0.09 to 0.36], and no difference when compared only against
active control [t(172) = −1.28 p = 0.20, d = 0.24, 95% CI from
0.08 to 0.40]. This finding did not offer support for the Hypothesis
2, which predicted that the mortality awareness CEO would
produce less value-driven attributions, compared to the control
conditions. Finally, the ANOVA revealed no significant group
differences in support for the decision [F(2,177)= 0.48, p= 0.62].
Neither of the planned contrasts showed significant differences.
However, the analysis did reveal a significant difference in
evaluation of decision maker [F(2,177) = 5.88, p < 0.01].
The planned contrast test showed a non-significant difference
between the mortality awareness condition and the two controls
combined [t(177)= 0.55, p= 0.58, d = 0.08, 95% CI from−0.11
to 0.26]. However, there were significant differences between
the mortality awareness CEO and the active control, in terms
of evaluation of decision maker [t(177) = −2.23, p = 0.03,
d = 0.38, 95% CI from 0.16 to 0.61]. These findings failed to
provide support for the third hypothesis, which stated that the
mortality awareness CEO would produce the lowest support for
her decision, and lowest levels of evaluation of decision maker.
Aside from testing the hypotheses, we also explored between
groups differences in reactive attributions. The groups were
found to differ significantly in terms of reactive attributions
[F(2,177) = 3.10, p = 0.04]. The actions of the mortality aware
CEO were perceived to a lesser degree to be a reaction to
external expectations, compared with the two control conditions
combined [t(177) = −2.56, p = 0.01, d = −0.39, 95% CI
from −0.54 to −0.26], and compared only to the active control
condition [t(177) = 2.23, p = 0.027, d = −0.42, 95% CI
from−0.59 to−0.26]. Figure 7 displays the mean evaluations and
attributions between groups.
Discussion
According to Kosloff and Greenberg (2009), as well as Arndt et al.
(2004), the decision maker portrayed in this experiment should
be expected to be more motivated by financial goal attainment as
a consequence of her recent mortality reminder, combined with
her life-long ambitions of financial goal attainment. However, the
results clearly indicate that participants did not perceive the CEO
in this manner. Even though TMT studies have demonstrated
the moderating role of personal importance of financial pursuits,
the present results indicate that people’s attributions of others
are not sensitive to the presence of this moderator. The lack
of support for any of the hypotheses, can be interpreted in
terms of the observed decision makers’ priority of financial gains
being less relevant in social perception and attribution. Much
like in Experiment 1, the decision maker who explained that
she had recently been exposed to a real life mortality reminder
was perceived as less motivated by financial gain and external
expectations, even though it was clearly stated that financial
goal attainment had long been a guiding goal for the decision
maker in question. Put in less technical terms, the participants’
attributions fell more along the lines of what one would predict
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TABLE 2 | Measurement model in Experiment 2.
Item: Mean SD Factor loadings
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
As an employee, support for decision 6,28 1,1 −0.745
As a customer, support for decision 5,93 1,27 −0.669
The decision is good 4,33 0.761 −0.755
Principled support for decision 4,54 0.712 −0.952
Disagree with decision (reversed) 4,52 0.758 0.886
Like decision maker 4,49 1,48 0.650
Decision maker seems professional 4,85 1,49 0.950
Decision maker seems competent 5,00 1,37 0.784
Perceived moral motivation 5,02 1,49 0.666
Goal appears to be reduced climate change 3,84 1,05 0.670
. . .they have a long term interest in society 3,55 1,06 0.740
. . . they believe in environmental care 3,77 1,04 0.886
. . . they are trying to give back to society 3,15 1,05 0.795
. . . they think their customers expect them to do this 3,17 1,15 0.816
. . . they think society in general expects them to do this 3,48 1,13 0.929
. . . they think their owners and other stakeholders expect them to do this 3,12 1,05 0.815
. . . they think they will retain more customers by doing this 3,60 0.992 −0.902
. . . they think they will get more customers by doing this 3,62 1,06 −0.856
Goal appears to be to please customers 3,71 1,02 −0.564
Perceived financial motivation 4,43 1,70 0.742
Goal appears to be to save money 3,31 1,14 0.878
Goal appears to be to ensure financial solidity 3,37 1,04 0.839
. . . they think they will earn/save more money by doing this 3,93 1,03 0.825
Attitudinal persuasion knowledge 4,02 0.948 0.898
Behavioral persuasion knowledge 3,86 1,04 0.892
after reading about Dickens Ebenezer Scrooge, and less in line
with the predictions one would make after reading TMT research
on how financially oriented people actually tend to respond to
mortality reminders. The only notable difference between the
results from Experiments 1 and 2 was that the former produced a
significant difference in value-based attributions, while the latter
did not. It would thus seem that mortality awareness increases
value-based attribution in cases where the decision maker is
unknown, but not in cases where the decision maker is known
for placing a high priority on financial goal attainment. However,
external and financial attributions were reduced as a consequence
of mortality awareness, regardless of the personal priorities of the
observed decision maker.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Taken together, the results confirm that communicating mortality
awareness when justifying ambiguously motivated CSR initiatives
alleviates suspicions of extrinsic motivation, and may leave
observers with a stronger perception that the decision is
motivated by sincerely held values. This attributional effect holds
true even in cases where the observed decision maker is known to
place a high priority on the pursuit of financial goal attainment.
Both experiments demonstrated that ambiguously motivated
CSR measures are met with more favorable attribution when
the CEO explains that the motivation came after a mortality
reminder. There are several direct implications from this result.
Firstly, it demonstrates that the same set of CSR measures can
induce very different motivational attributions among observers,
based on how those CSR measures are presented. Secondly, the
results indicate that people suspect behaviors to be less motivated
by extrinsic and financial factors, when the person they evaluate
attributes her decision to a recent mortality reminder. This
change in attribution is likely not due to pity alone, as the active
control condition, which presumably also induces pity, produced
attributions more similar to that of the passive control condition
than that of the mortality awareness condition. Furthermore,
the improved motivational attribution is demonstrated to be
indirectly associated with evaluation of decision maker and
willingness to pay. This finding highlights the importance
of perceived sincerity of motives when communicating CSR
policies, which resonates concordantly with other findings in CSR
communication (Du et al., 2010; Groza et al., 2011; de Vries et al.,
2013).
The results offer some careful practical implications.
Motivational ambiguity is ubiquitous in both general
management and marketing. The main result from this
study is that mortality awareness can function as a factor that
alleviates some of that ambiguity, and induces a sense of sincerity
on behalf of the observed decision maker. Presumably, other
ways of conveying mortality awareness, other than recapping
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FIGURE 7 | Mean evaluation between groups, when decision maker is known for prioritizing financial goal attainment. ∗ Difference between mortality
awareness and passive control is significant at p < 0.05. ∗∗ Difference between mortality awareness and active control is significant at p < 0.05. ∗∗∗ Differences
between mortality awareness and both control groups are significant at p < 0.05.
one’s own recent mortality reminders, can produce similar
benefits. Invoking a life-death narrative when communicating
ambiguously motivated CSR measures might produce similar
results, in that peoples tendency to attribute the initiatives to
extrinsic factors decreases. The results further indicate that
people expect a drop in the priority of financial gains as a
consequence of mortality salient experiences. This finding gives
further practical implications. When faced with suspicion of
being motivated by greed, rather than virtue, invoking a mortality
salient narrative behind one’s decisions can give an indication
of authenticity, thus reducing cynical attributions and creating
more engagement and approval for the decision.
The experiment made use of vivid and realistic video-stimuli,
in order to increase ecological validity. Nevertheless, we want to
highlight some potential limitations. As is the case for almost
all lab-experiments in social sciences, the results stem from
hypothetical scenarios, and are therefore free from circumstantial
factors that may be crucial to any real-life scenario involving
the role of mortality primes in eliciting different attributions.
Furthermore, the distinction between the active control condition
(dentistry) and experimental manipulation (mortality reminder)
has been subject to some criticism (Burke et al., 2010). TMT
research has typically suggested that the threat of mortality
produces qualitatively different consequences than similar non-
mortality control primes. Indeed, the premises and conclusion
of this paper partially rely on the same assertion. However,
it cannot be definitely concluded that the distinction between
mortality primes and other negative events are qualitative, and
not quantitative. If the only real difference between the active
control and the mortality awareness manipulation is the level
of pity induced in the participants, a theoretical implication
would be that sufficiently elevated levels of pity, not perceived
mortality awareness, might produce a similar effect. In both
the active control condition and mortality awareness condition,
the CEO links her account of health problems to the CSR
decision by the sentence fragment “[...] it got me thinking
about what really matters in life”. This sentence was necessary
in order for the CEO’s statements to be meaningful in their
given context. However, we cannot rule out that this statement
comes across as more plausible and sincere when stated as a
consequence to a potentially lethal health-scare, than a non-
lethal health scare. We recommend that future studies of
perceptions of motivation under mortality awareness should
attempt to continue to explore these processes in ecologically
valid manners, while attempting to keep the experimental
condition and the active control condition as similar as possible.
The presented research was primarily concerned with between-
groups differences in evaluation and attribution, based on
the CEO’s reported mortality awareness. In order to explore
this effect, other factors pertaining to the CEO were held
constant across conditions. There is thus a possibility that
the reported tendencies are the result of interaction effects
between mortality awareness and unique factors pertaining to the
CEO, such as gender, age, physical appearance or other visible
factors.
The results offer some further directions for future research.
First, the degree of liking the decision to implement the CSR
initiatives, evaluation of decision maker and willingness to pay,
did not differ between the groups in any of the experiments,
even though the attributional patterns differed significantly
between the groups. This finding goes against the importance
placed on motivational attribution in past research, both in CSR
communication (see Yoon et al., 2006; Du et al., 2010; Groza et al.,
2011; McShane and Cunningham, 2012; de Vries et al., 2013),
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and in moral psychology (see Fedotova et al., 2011; Gray et al.,
2012). A possible explanation for why the changes is motivational
attribution were not accompanied by direct changes in evaluation
of decision maker, support for decision or willingness to pay, may
be that the described scenario entailed removing hedonic value
for the customer. Past research has indicated that consumers
often dislike CSR measures that impedes the organizations ability
to deliver value to the consumer (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001;
Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006). As such, it may be that the
participants responses to the question of whether or not they
liked the decision was overly focused on the removal of hedonic
value, making the issue of motivational attribution less salient.
Other mediating variables, not measured in the experiments, may
also have influenced the outcomes. However, these are merely
speculative interpretations, and more research is needed in order
to better understand the antecedents of consumer support for
CSR measures.
CONCLUSION
The problem of negative motivational attribution hinders the
endorsement of effective CSR measures that can mitigate climate
change. The presented research explored the role of mortality
awareness on attribution of environmentally friendly behaviors.
The first experiment demonstrated that when a CEO implements
environmentally friendly corporate measures after a mortality
reminder, her motivation for doing so was perceived as more
value-oriented, meaning that it was attributed more to intrinsic
values, and less to extrinsic factors. This attributional pattern
was indirectly linked to an increase in positive evaluation of
decision maker and increased willingness to pay, even though
the CSR measures entailed removing hedonic value at the
customers’ expense. The second experiment demonstrated that
the reduction in extrinsic and financial attribution observed in
the first experiment persisted, also when the decision maker was
known for placing a high priority on financial goal attainment.
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